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This introductory essay offers a brief guided tour of the main developments in
the theory of implicit contracts, from its inception to the present. It is not intended
as a survey but, rather, as an appraisal ofthe progress that has been made, the dif-
ficulties that remain, and as an outline ofthe microeconomic and macroeconomic issues
that seem to invite additional work.
I
This issue of the Journal brings together several recent contri-
butions on implicit contracts and quantity-constrained equilibria.
Almost ten years ago, the tbeory of implicit contracts signaled a fresh
effort by economists to understand the twin empirical regularities of
wage stickiness and involuntary unemployment, amid hopes tbat the
microeconomic foundations of Keynesian macroeconomics, especially
those of the fixed price method, would be strengthened in tbe pro-
cess.
This introductory essay offers a brief guided tour of the main
developments in tbe theory of implicit contracts, from its inception
to tbe present. Our purpose, however, is somewhat different from tbat
t)f ordinary tourguides: we do not intend to survey the landscape^ but,
ratber, to appraise the progress that has been made, to identify some
of tbe difficulties, and to outline tbe microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic issues tbat seem to invite additional work.
• We acknowledge with thanks financial support from the National Science
Koundation.
1. The landscape is surveyed in Azariadis [1979], Hart [1982], Ito [1982], and
Schwartz [1982].
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We begin the tour in Section II with a description ofthe empirical
regularities to be explained, and review in Sections III and IV the
major insights of implicit contract theory—from the older, public-
information literature, as well as from more recent work on asym-
metric information. The newer literature makes heavy use of some
concepts common to many self-selection problems; we discuss these
concepts in Section V. Section VI covers macroeconomic aspects of
implicit contracts—in particular, their relation to the fixed price
literature. The concluding section is concerned with a survey of un-
resolved issues.
n
Over a typical business cycle, average wages fluctuate less vig-
orously than does labor's marginal revenue product or, for that matter,
the total volume of employment (see Hall [1980]). The Great De-
pression is a sad illustration: from 1929 to 1933 U.S. employment fell
precipitously, while real wages managed to creep upward. At a less
aggregative level, it is standard collective bargaining procedure to
predetermine money wage rates for two or three years in advance, even
though wage rigidity does not promote employment in recessions.^
The sluggishness of money wage rates, notably in periods of
relatively stable inflation, and the strong contribution of layoffs to
cyclical unemployment in North America have long been two of the
best-documented stylized facts in economics.'' Wage and price rigidity
are also among the key assumptions of Keynesian macroeconomics,
both in the Hicksian IS/LM framework {see Hicks [1937]) and in the
very interesting concept of quantity-constrained equilibrium origi-
nally developed by Patinkin [1956], Clower [1965], Hansen [1974],
Solow-Stiglitz [1968], Younes [1970], and Barro-Grossman [1971],
and formalized by European economists in the 1970s.'*
Keynes's own explanation of wage rigidity [1936, p. 13-15] was
a sophisticated form of money illusion; workers resist cuts in money
wage rates because they do not know how widespread these cuts will
prove to be, each worker fearing a fall in his own wage relative to
others. Relative wage arguments suggest that "fairness" in the wage
2. However, as the recent experience in the United States indicates, if too large
a level of unemployment is caused by wage rigidity, both sides may agree to renegotiatf
the terms of the contract. Cousineau and Lacroix |1981] analyze an interesting set ol'
data collected from Canadiein collective bargaining agreements.
3. An example is the work of Feldstein [1976).
4. The main developments appear in Benassy [l975], Dreze [1975], Younes [1975[,
andMalinvaud[1977|.
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structure is a factor to be reckoned with in labor supply decisions,^
but do not develop an operational definition of "fairness."*' This is
perhaps one reason why the relative wage argument did not gain
ground in economics."
Students of human capital^ have provided another theory of
layoffs, namely, that the accumulation of job-specific skills requires
the sinking of certain expenses for hiring and training. This is an in-
vestment the employer makes in anticipation that the worker will
remain attached to his job, and one he amortizes over time by paying
a wage rate lower than the trained employee's marginal contribution
to the firm. If the firm should need to reduce employment in periods
of slack demand, it will naturally choose to lay off first the least
trained members of its labor force, those who represent the smallest
undepreciated investment in training.
This story is a satisfactory explanation ofthe incidence of layoffs^
not of their existence; it tells us why layoffs fall on the least skilled
workers but leaves open the question why they occur in the first place,
which is our concern here. Furthermore, the technical heterogeneity
of labor that is crucial for this argument is itself an unnecessary
complication in traditional macroeconomic models that are built on
the simpler assumptions of homogeneous inputs and zero transaction
costs.
UI
The innovation in the early Uterature on implicit contracts [Baily,
1974; Gordon, 1974; Azariadis, 1975] was to view the employment
relation not simply as a sequential spot exchange of labor services for
money, but as a more complicated long-term attachment; labor ser-
vices are traded for an insurance contract that protects workers from
random, publicly observed fluctuations in their marginal revenue
product. The idea, shown in Figure I, is that workers can purchase
insurance only from their employers, not from third parties.
Risk-averse workers deal with risk-neutral entrepreneurs whose
firms consist of three departments: a production department that
purchases labor services and credits each worker with his marginal
5. This is apparent in Okun's posthumous book [1981|, pp. 9'i-97.
6. Such a definition was later developed in welfare economics; see Varian |1974|.
Schmeidler and Yaari [I97l|.
7. See Akerlof |1980J for a recent attempt at a theory of wage rigidity based on
"norms,"
8. The standard reference is Becker |1964j; our argument is due to Oi 11962].
9. For a contractual model of layoff incidence, see Azariadis [1976j.
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revenue product {MRPL); an insurance department that sells actu-
arially fair policies, and depending on the state of nature, credits the
worker with a net insurance indemnity (Nil) or debits him with a net
insurance premium; and an accounting department that pays each
employed worker a wage w with the property that w = MRPL + Nil
in every state of nature.
Favorable states of nature are associated with high values of
MRPL; in these the net indemnity is negative, and wage falls short
of the MRPL. Adverse states of nature correspond to low values of
MRPL, to positive net insurance indemnities, and to wages in excess
of MRPL. An implicit contract is then a complete description, made
before the state of nature becomes known, of the labor services to be
rendered unto the firm in each state of nature, and of the corre-
sponding payments to be delivered to the worker. The contract is
implementable if we assume the state of nature is directly observed
by all sides.
An immediate consequence of this framework is that wages are
disengaged from the marginal revenue product of labor. In fact, if we
fix institutionally the amount of labor performed by employed
workers, then each worker's consumption is proportional to the wage
rate; an actuarially fair insurance policy should make this consump-
tion independent of the MRPL by stabilizing the purchasing power
of wages over states of nature. Ergo, the real wage rate is rigid.
In traditional macroeconomic models, of course, wage rigidity
by itself is sufficient to cause unemployment: if wages do not adjust
for some reason, than neither does the demand for labor. The argu-
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ment does not carry over to implicit contracts because of the very
separation between wages and the marginal revenue product of labor.
A complete theory of unemployment must explain why layoffs are
preferred to work sharing in adverse states of nature, and why laid-off
workers are worse off than their employed colleagues.
This is not a simple task. Suppose, for instance, that employers
are risk-neutral and that workers' preferences over consumption and
leisure can be represented by a strictly quasi-concave, additively
separable utility function. Then optimum contracts will result in
complete work-sharing [Mortensen, 1978]; and if such work-sharing
is less profitable than layoffs for technological reasons (e.g., workers
produce most efficiently when they put in a full-day's effort), an op-
timum contract under perfect information will still equate the
workers' marginal utility of consumption in states of employment and
unemployment. Individuals may thus become involuntarily em-
ployed: they would rather be laid off than work.
The resolution of this quandary has been the objective of much
recent research on the theory of implicit contracts. The papers of this
symposium represent a good step forward, but as we shall see later,
many questions remain unresolved. To explain unemployment, we
need to complicate the analysis in some important way. Some of the
complications arise from familiar problems in explicit (as opposed
to implicit) insurance contracts, but a few of the problems are peculiar
to implicit contracts.
One distortion that was noted early in the implicit contract lit-
erature concerns the role of the dole. In very adverse states of nature,
the flow of insurance indemnities to workers can become a substantial
drain on profit; one way to staunch losses is to place the burden of
insurance on an outside party, the dole (see Figure I). The practice
of layoffs is simply the administrative counterpart of this insur-
ance-shifting maneuver; workers consent in advance that some of
them may be separated from their jobs in order to become eligible for
unemployment insurance (UI) payments from an outside public
agency. Furthermore, no worker will contract his labor, unless the
expected value (utility) ofthe total package taken over all possible
states of nature exceeds the value of being on the dole in every state.
This means, in turn, that employed workers receive a wage in excess
of UI payments, and are therefore to be envied by their laid-off col-
leagues—a situation that many economists would call "involuntary
unemployment."
This particular insurance contract between a third party (the
government) and the other two parties (workers, firms) is not neces-
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sarily efficient. It may, however, be the only feasible way of providing
third-party insurance; theoretically it is preferable that the govern-
ment pay a lump sum indemnity to the firm when its profit is low, or
to the worker when his income is low. The government, however,
cannot always ascertain with precision the actual income or the op-
portunity sets of individuals; what it insures, therefore, is not an ex-
ogenous event but an endogenous variable that is more readily ob-
servable, and that, under reasonable circumstances, is correlated with
the exogenous event. This creates an important moral hazard prob-
lem^ '^ to which we shall return in Sections IV and V.
Another source of problems for implicit contracts—which applies
as well to the insurance literature but has even more force here—is
the enforceability of contracts. Implicit contracts are just t h a t -
implicit—and one must ask what happens when either side deviates
from the contract. Because the contracts are implicit, contracting
parties may not have any legal recourse against breach. Contracts
must thus either be self-enforcing or be enforced through reputa-
tions.^'
To put the issue in plainer terms, let us focus on the worker; If
his wage on average equals his marginal revenue product, what is to
stop him from quitting in the good states, when his marginal revenue
product is greater than his wage? The worker would thereby receive
the benefits ofthe insurance offered by the firm (when the wage re-
ceived exceeds the value of his marginal revenue product), and would
refuse to pay the insurance premiums. What is to stop him from
reneging on his "implicit" contract?
One early answer focused on the role of reputation: workers on
contract might choose to reject outside offers at higher wages if, by
doing so, they established a reputation for "reliability" that would
enable them subsequently to attract the preferential contracts handed
out to "reliable" workers.
The precise manner in which one acquires a particular reputation
is rather hard to analyze. Fortunately, we do not have to, for reputa-
tion is essential to the enforceability of implicit labor contracts only
within the artificial confines of single-period contracts. Bengt
Holmstrom demonstrates the point admirably in his paper "Equi-
librium Long-Term Labor Contracts" {thiB Journal]. Holmstrom al-
lows workers to sign multiperiod contracts that they can abrogate at
no cost after one period if they find a higher-paying job in the spot
10. A standard early reference on moral hazard is Arrow |1971J; for a more recent
treatment see Arnott and Stiglitz [1982|,
11. H. Grossman (19771 was among the first to point out this problem.
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market. Nevertheless, equilibrium contracts will be structured so that
workers choose not to annul them: wages in the first period, when
workers cannot leave, are lower than (the expected value of) MRPL;
in the second period wages rise to equal either a state-invariant rate
or the spot rate, whichever is greater.
New workers on contract thus pay the firm a "bond" that assures
they will behave reliably in the future. As the bond is amortized over
time, veteran employees receive higher wages than rookies do—at
least as high, in fact, as spot wages. Holmstrom's multiperiod equi-
librium thus yields reliable behavior on the part of workers (his firms
being reliable by definition), wage differentials by seniority class, and
a weakening of strict wage rigidity to downward rigidity.
Holmstrom's argument parallels the standard argument as to
how the firm recovers the costs of specific training of workers.'"-^  If
workers have limited access to the capital market, increased mobility
implies that their consumption stream over time is not so smooth as
it otherwise would be, and there is a welfare loss as a result. In addi-
tion, however, workers may need to leave the firm for a variety of good
reasons (their health is bad, their mother-in-law moves to a nearby
state, etc.).
Unfortunately, there is no easy way of distinguishing these le-
gitimate motives for quitting from the opportunistic motives (i.e.,
simply reneging on the contract). Hence, any contract that requires
workers to post bonds imposes some risk on them—the risk that they
forfeit the bond even if they desire to change jobs for noneconomic
reasons. As a result, there will seldom be "complete" bonding. Finally,
there is always another risk associated with any theory of contract
enforcement through bonding: that the employer will fire the worker
(or, equivalently, make work conditions so unattractive that the
worker will be induced to quit and forfeit the bond).'-' To avoid these
difficulties, either a far more complicated bonding scheme must be
established, or we must rely on a theory of reputation for firms.
IV
Let us return to a simpler world in which firms are thoroughly
trustworthy and workers never quit for family reasons. Having at least
reassured ourselves that we can redesign the time path of wage pay-
ments to extract reliable behavior from workers, we go back to the
single-period enforceable contract structure of Figure I to reflect on
12. A more extensive treatment appears in Arnott and Stiglitz (1981].
13. See Shapiro and Stiglitz [1982] fora detailed discussion ofthis problem.
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the nature of layoff unemployment^^ How close is tbe unemployment
we discussed in the previous section to the involuntary unemployment
that economists are so concerned about?
The fact that laid-off workers would gladly exchange places with
their employed colleagues is not in itself sufficient to establish a
misallocation of resources. After all, accident victims may very well
envy more fortunate individuals without any implication that the
insurance industry works poorly. Layoffs, by themselves, could be no
more than the luck of the draw unless we can demonstrate that they
constitute, in some sense, socially inefficient underemployment. This
is clearly impossible within the Walras-Arrow-Debreu model.
There are, in fact, two distinct questions that we can pose. One
is, do limitations on information, transactions costs, etc., when for-
mally modeled into the optimal design ofthe implicit contract, lead
to levels of employment that are systematically lower than would
occur in a Walrasian equilibrium? The second is, taking these limi-
tations on information, transactions costs, etc., into account, can
we design (say, through tax policy) a Pareto improvement in the
economy? Like most of the literature, this symposium focuses on the
first question; i.e., on conditions under which market equilibrium
might be characterized by layoffs, or by hours worked being less than
in the corresponding Walrasian equilibrium.
One fundamental departure from the Walrasian paradigm that
seems much in the spirit of implicit contracts is to alter the informa-
tional assumptions: information is no longer "public" or "symmetric,"
it is "private" or "asymmetric," since only one side of the market
observes the relevant state of nature. Four ofthe papers that appear
in this issue (by Azariadis, Chari, Green and Kahn, and Grossman and
Hart) study the properties of implicit contracts when the value of
labor's marginal revenue product is known only to the entrepre-
neur.^^
Asymmetric information is essential for a thorough under-
standing of implicit contracts and, as we shall see later in this essay,
for their use in macroeconomics as well. What justifies the trading of
these contracts in the first place is that third parties simply are not
as well informed about someone's income or employment status as
is his employer; the employer, in turn, may be less informed about an
14, Developments here were greatly influenced by the paper of Akerlof and Mi-
yazaki [1980].
15, Calvo and Phelps [1977] were the first to pose this Question; for related work
see Hall and Lilien [1979].
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employee's nonlabor income and job opportunities than is the worker
himself.
Let us face these complications one at a time. First, how does the
market write and evaluate state-contingent contracts when the state
itself is observed by employers alone? Suppose that S is the set of all
possible states, and consider the possibility tbat wages and employ-
ment are predetermined functions of the state announced by the
employer. For the sake of concreteness, we begin witb the contract
6*, which the parties find optimal under symmetric information; the
employer observes the true state s, announces some state 0, and the
wage-employment combination is whatever 6* specifies for 0. Will the
employer tell the truth by announcing s = H? If so, we say that 5* is
implementable; if not, we must pick another contract.
We recall from the previous section that the contract 5* does not
generally equate wages with MRPL, which implies that, if the firm
told the truth, it would not maximize profit in state s. To do so for
sufficiently adverse states, the firm will sometimes (that is, for some,
but not all, possible combinations of worker and entrepreneur pref-
erences) announce a state worse than what actually occurs.
If an optimum public-information contract is unimplementable
under asymmetric information, we know from economic theory^ '^ that
it can be appropriately modified to motivate entrepreneurs to tell the
truth in each state of nature. This is accomplished by making truth
the value-maximizing strategy for firms in each state of nature.
All four symposium papers on asymmetric information exploit
this straightforward idea but differ in operational details. The papers
by Azariadis, and Grossman and Hart begin with optimum symmet-
ric-information contracts that are not implementable when infor-
mation is asymmetric because entrepreneurs will announce a state
lower than actual; to cure this lack of incentive-compatibility, em-
ployment in all states but the highest is reduced below its optimum
symmetric-information value. By appropriately restricting the level
of employment and restructuring wages, truthful announcements
come to be in the entrepreneur's own best interest.
In the papers by Chari, and Green and Kahn, however, entre-
preneurs' state announcements are biased upward under that opti-
mum full-information contract. To change the incentive structure,
asymmetric-information contracts increase employment in all states
of nature, except the lowest, beyond its full-information level.
16. The fundamental ideas on allocation mechanisms with the revelation property
are developed in Myerson [1979] and Harris and Townsend [19811.
10 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
In an economy without informational or other distortions, en-
trepreneurs and workers can write contracts that support a Pareto
optimal allocation of both risk and effort. The contribution of the four
papers we are discussing is to show exactly how this first-best allo-
cation is disturbed when information about what state of nature has
occurred is private. Neither risk nor effort is then distributed opti-
mally: not all individuals have identical marginal rates of substitution
between consumption in any given pair of states; and the marginal
disutility of work does not equal the marginal utility of consumption
in every state.
As a result, all four papers agree that there will be departures
from the first-best volume of employment in almost all states. There
is less uniformity on what specific form this inefficiency takes: for two
of these papers [Azariadis; Grossman and Hart] it appears as exces-
sively low employment in adverse states; for two others [Chari; Green
and Kahn], it appears as excessively high employment in favorable
states. As we show in Section V, the differences arise because these
investigations do not share a common preference structure.
Before we make up our mind whether private information leads
to involuntary unemployment or overemployment, it is prudent to
remember that we are discussing a rather one-sided class of infor-
mation impactedness models. Workers, too, possess specialized
knowledge, about their own preferences and outside employment
opportunities, that far surpasses their employer's.
Suppose, for instance,^ "^ that the utility function of tbe typical
worker is additively separable in consumption and leisure, and assume
the marginal rate of substitution, that is, the number of consumption
units per unit of leisure along an indifference curve, is a random
variable s. With risk-neutral employers, an optimum public-infor-
mation contract is to free the wage bill, and the worker's consumption,
from all variability; and to cboose an employment schedule that de-
creases in s.
Once more we have a contract that is not implementable under
private information for it compels self-seeking workers always to
announce the highest credible value of s. An optimum private-in-
formation contract may reward truthtelling (or punish lying) in two
ways: it makes the wage bill a decreasing function of .s, and it lowers
employment below public-information levels in all states but tbe
highest. The outcome is involuntary underemployment again.
17. The rest of this section is based on unpublished work by Ruaseli Cooper[1981]. ^
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To sum up: it seems a safe claim that private information by itself
is sufficient to explain departures of employment from its fully Pareto
optimal volume. First principles of economics, however, do not
guarantee that "involuntary" (that is, inefficient) underemployment
or imemployment is a necessary consequence of every informational
asymmetry. The direction of the inefficiency depends on several
factors, one of them being the nature of this asymmetry.
In this section we attempt to explain with elementary diagram-
matical techniques why implicit contracts with asymmetric infor-
mation are characterized by unemployment in some instances and
overemployment in others. We formulate the simplest possible model.
There are two equiprobable states of nature, denoted by subscripts
1 and 2. Instate ^,, the gross revenue of the firm per worker is F(/i,,^i),
where /i, is the number of hours worked by the worker. Tbe contract
specifies the income paid the worker and the hours worked in each
state \wi ,hi \. The firm knows the state of nature, but the workers does
not. The contract terms must be designed to maximize the expected
profits of the firm, subject to the firm being able to recruit workers
(i.e., the worker's expected utility being at a sufficiently high level);
and it must explicitly take into account the informational asym-
metry.
This problem is formally similar to a wide class of "screening"
problems involving the use of self-selection mechanisms, and we can
therefore borrow a number of standard results from that theory. That
literature distinguishes between two classes of equilibria. In one of
them, behavior is invariant to the state that occurs (in our context,
w and h do not depend on 0). This is referred to as a pooling equilib-
rium; pooling equilibria are of particular interest in macroeconomic
situations, as they imply a lack of adjustment in important economic
variables (employment) to changes in the environment (productivity
of labor). In the other class of equilibria, behavior varies with the state.
There are two obvious reasons that there should be an adjustment in
wages and hours in response to changes in /': first, changes in the
productivity of work call for changes in the number of hours worked
(i.e., changes in total employment); second, if firms are risk-averse,
the optimal contract (with perfect or with asymmetric information)
would entail some risk sharing, which means tabor income would
vary.
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As in most self-selection problems, the employee cannot rely on
the honesty of the employer to announce the true 6, and set h and w
accordingly. If contract wage payments do not vary much over states
but hours of work do, the employer may announce a good state when
the bad one occurs in order to extract more hours from laborers; if,
on the other hand, wage payments vary substantially more than do
hours of work, the employer may announce the adverse state when
tbe favorable one occurs in order to lower costs. The design of the
optimal contract takes these possibilities into account.
Let iriOi.dj) = F{hj,di) - Wj be the entrepreneur's profit in state
i if he announces state i {ij = 1,2). As we know, the first-best contract
d* = \w*{6),h*iO)\ maximizes under perfect information the firms'
expected profit:
(1) ^=(V2)[^(9i,^i) + 7r(M2)]
subject to nonnegativity, and to an expected-utility constraint,
(2) iy2)[u{wuhi) + uiw2,h2)] > u.
which enables the firm to recruit laborers. Here u(-) is a von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern index for individual workers, and U is the reser-
vation value of their expected utility.
With asymmetric information, the optimum contract maximizes
equation (1) subject to inequality (2), and to two additional self-se-
lection (or truthtelling) constraints, i.e.,
(3) TTidiA) > 7r((9i,02); 7r(M2) > 7r(Mi).
To see exactly what self-selection constraints do, we depict in
Figure II the first-best contract 8*, assuming that, ceteris paribus, the
marginal revenue product of labor is higher in state 2 than in state 1.
In that diagram we plot for each state i = 1,2, the (concave) isoprofit
line and the (convex) indifference curve that goes through the optimal
pair {h',w'). Because 5* is first-best, each pair ih',wi) corresponds
to a tangency point between tbe relevant isoprofit line and indiffer-
ence curve. From Figure II, it is clear that in state 1 profits are higher
if the firm announces that the state is 1 than if it announces that it
is 2; the isoprofit line for state 1 through ih\,wI) yields higher profit
than the isoprofit line for state 1 tbrough ih2,W2). The same is true
of state 2. Thus, even though there is asymmetric information, the
contract 8* is implementable, for firms will correctly reveal the true
state.
Two more interesting situations are shown in Figures III and IV.
Figure III, again, contains the first-best contract. We note, however,
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FIGURE II
First-Best Equilibrium Implementable
that profits in state 2 are higher if the firm announces state 1 (so that
payments to workers are lowered tow']) than if it tells the truth.
The first-best contract 8* is no longer implementable: by an-
u = u •< u
FicnuK HI
First-Best Equilibrium Not Implementable
Second-best equilibrium characterized by inefficient underemployment in adverse
state.
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Fir.UHR IV
First-Best Equilibrium Nol Implementable
Second-best equilibrium characterized by inefficient overemployment in favorable
state.
nouncing falsely that the bad state has occurred, the first extracts
fewer hours than otherwise from its workers; but the reduction in
hours is not sufficient to outweigh the gain obtained from lower wages.
To induce truthteiling, a stronger punishment is required. If {h\,w])
is lowered to (fii,Wi), as depicted, the firm will no longer have any
incentive to lie. But truthtelling has been obtained at a cost: while
under the first-best contract (i.e., in a Walrasian equilibrium) the
worker's marginal rate of substitution is equal to his marginal revenue
product (i.e., to the slope ofthe relevant isoprofit line), at (fi\,Wi) the
two are not equal; the marginal revenue product exceeds the marginal
rate of substitution. It is in this sense that asymmetric information
results in unemployment or, more accurately, in underemploy-
ment.
In Figure IV we depict an equilibrium in which, under the first-
best contract, there is relatively little variability in the wage bill. The
firm then always has the incentive to announce the go<xl state, forcing
workers into longer hours. The first-best contract is again not im-
plementable. To induce truthtelling, we must make the firm pay the
workers much more than otherwise if it announces the good state; this
is easily accomplished by raising {W2,h2) to, say, {ti2,fi2)- But again.
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truthtelling comes at a cost: the marginal revenue product of labor
is now less than the marginal rate of substitution. The equilibrium
contract suffers from overemployment.
Since underemployment and overemployment are both possible,
the reader may ask under what circumstances the former or the tatter
are a property of equilibrium contracts with asymmetric information.
Suppose first that entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and workers have
additively separable preferences, which implies that leisure is a normal
good. Then the equilibrium contract cannot consist of the pairs
{w\,fii) and {w2,h'2) depicted in Figure III; if it did, we could modify
it by raising the wage bill in the bad state by a small number Aw,
lowering the wage bill in the good state by the same amount, and
leaving hours of work unchanged.
The new contract we would obtain this way would obviously
continue to satisfy the self-selection constraints, would not affect
expected profit if the two states are equiprobable, and be, at the same
time, preferred by workers, since it stabilizes their earnings.
Overemployment will therefore be the equilibrium outcome given
the configuration of preferences assumed in the previous paragraph.
But the argument there breaks down, and underemployment emerges,
if entrepreneurs are at the margin more risk-averse than workers. We
recall also from Section IV that underemployment may well be the
result of private information on the worker's side.
VI
What have we learned, or are we likely to learn, about macro-
economics from implicit contracts? We shall discuss three aspects of
this question here: aggregate unemployment, money wage rigidity,
and the connection of implicit contracts to the literature on quan-
tity-constrained equilibria.
For all the advances described in previous sections, we do not yet
have at hand an entirely satisfactory aggregative story of unemploy-
ment or of money wage rigidity. The asymmetric-information models
of Section IV suffer from some limitations that should be mentioned,
perhaps as incentive for further work. First, and least important, they
depict inefficient underemployment as worksharing, not as layoffs.
Second, they do not supply a general equilibrium picture of under-
employment, which would require an explanation why underem-
ployed (or unemployed) individuals are not hired by other firms.'**
18. Hosios [1981] has formulated a simple general equilibrium model analyzing
layoffs and new hires simultaneously.
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Third, and most important, the unemployment found in the contri-
butions to this symposium is a response to private, firm-specific risks,
while observed unemployment in market economies is tbought by
most economists to be a reaction to social risks, especially to business
cycles set in motion by aggregate demand disturbances. Unless one
intends to make the far-fetched claim that the general public is un-
aware of changes in government consumption, money supply, or
consumer confidence, does it not appear that information-based
unemployment simply describes the behavior of an isolated firm?
We do not think so. In order to have an inefficient volume of
equilibrium employment, it is sufficient that some but not all infor-
mation be private. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine general equi-
librium extensions of the work we are discussing that would include
both public and private information [Farmer, 1981; and Grossman,
Hart, and Maskin, 1982]. Such extensions wiil be particularly useful
if they manage to establish a firm link between inefficient underem-
ployment and extreme values of some publicly observed aggregate
disturbance.
Whatever progress we have made toward understanding fluc-
tuations in employment has not dispelled the dense fog that still
shrouds the issue of wage rigidity. All we have to go on is the well-
known result of Baily [1974, pp. 44-46] that the wage rate is state-
invariant under public information when iabor supply is inelastic.
This stickiness, however, is a property of the real rather than the
nominal wage rate, and it is the latter that is assumed to be rigid in
Keynesian macroeconomics.
To understand wage rigidity, in our view, one must begin with
a careful definition of it. Rigidity does not necessarily imply complete
time-invariance, nor does it require money wages to change less fre-
quently than other prices; it is simply an information-processing
failure. The standard procedure in collective bargains, for instance,
is to predetermine money wages several years in advance; more often
than not those wages are invariant to any information that may ac-
cumulate over the duration ofthe contract. Only in exceptional cir-
cumstances are money wages in the United States allowed to reflect
any contemporaneous developments in the cost of living (indexation)
or in the profitability of the employer (bankruptcy).
The mystery of wage rigidity is then the failure of contracts to
set money wages as functions of publicly available information that
is obviously reievant to the welfare of all parties. Why does the
wage-setting process choose to ignore this information? One answer
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is transactions costs [Wachter and Williamson, 1978]:'^ contracts are
cheaper to evaluate and implement when they are defined by a few
simple numbers rather than by functions. True enough, but the cost
of recomputing wages every month drops sharply witb every new
generation of computers; and even before the age of computers, it
would be perilous, we think, to attribute to transactions costs whatever
unemployment is due to wage infiexibility in adverse stages of ag-
gregate demand.
We find more promise in an argument that relies on the risk-
bearing properties of alternative contracting schemes. Economies with
private information, or with an incomplete array of securities markets,
rarely admit equilibria supporting a fuily Pareto optimal allocation
of resources.^" It is therefore possible, but not certain, that a superior
allocation will result from the introduction of new securities. We re-
gard implicit contracts as securities and inquire whether to invent
them would be in everyone's—or anyone's—interest/^'
The outcome of this inquiry must depend on the market struc-
ture that existed before the invention of contracts as well as on the
type of contracts we are willing to contemplate. Kihlstrom and Laffont
study the question in their paper "Implicit Labor Contracts and Free
Entry" [this Journal].'^'^ The authors compare three alternative labor
market structures: a pure spot market that operates in the usuai
Walrasian manner, equating supply and demand in each state of
nature; a pure forward exchange of labor services for a sure (that is,
fixed) wage that is determined in advance; and a combination of these
two markets that permits sequential trades, with forward contracts
concluded before the state is revealed, and spot exchange afterward.
As Kiblstrom and Laffont demonstrate, if entrepreneurs and workers
are alike, the third market structure dominates each of the first
19. Gray [1976[ provides a theory of indexation based on transactions costs.
20. The work of Diamond [1967] and Stiplitz [1982] on the stock market, and of
Hart [19751 on temporary equilibrium are relevant here.
21. We are nol addressing the conceptually distinct problems of hnui sucb secu-
rities come to be invented.
22. A related paper by Peters [forthcoming] examines whether it in desirable to
introduce implicit contracls in an economy consisting of a spot and of a stoc k market
that does not contain enough securities to span all states of nature. Azariadis and
Cooper 11981) study how fixed-price contracts allocate endowment risks in a monetary
economy,
2;i. In an interesting aside, tbe same paper verifies a widespread assumption in
the literature that typecasts entrepreneurs as risk-neutral and workers as risk-averse.
The authors show that, if tbe technology satisfies sU)chastic con8tant-return.s-to-scale
and individuals have a choice of becoming either entrepreneurs or workers, then risk-
neutral persons will not become workers in equilibrium.
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To the evidence of progress on unemployment, we may add on
the score card of implicit contracts a reasonable chance of similar
advances on money wage rigidity, properly discounted, of course, for
most of these advances are still to come. We have less to report on
quantity constraints and rigid prices in commodity markets.
This is not entirely a surprise for there are some decent non-
contract stories to tell about quantity constraints. One of them is told
in the paper, "Toward a Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics:
Expectations and Constrained Equilibria," by Neary and Stiglitz [this
Journal]: current quantity constraints are caused by the expectation,
justified or not, of future quantity constraints. For instance, producers
may increase current sales if they anticipate that they may be rationed
in the future, thus contributing to a state of excess supply in the
present r"^
A different explanation is offered by Bohm, Maskin, Polemar-
chakis, and Postlewaite in "Monopolistic Quantity Rationing" [this
Journal]. Here the question is whether it is in the interest of a mo-
nopolist, or any seller with some market power, to use quantity ra-
tioning as an allocative device, in addition to setting price. Linear
prices with quantity constraints are, of course, a special case of a
nonlinear price schedule that may be used to extract the consumer
surplus of any one buyer, or to exploit differences among buyers.
The price nonlinearities one obtains from quantity constraints
are rather primitive, not permitting price discrimination of the first
kind; rationing is therefore of no use when buyers are identical. In an
example with three goods and three types of buyers, however, the
authors demonstrate that rationing may well be desirable for mo-
nopolists because it is akin to price discrimination of the second kind.
We might also add parenthetically that rationing will seem less of-
fensive than direct price discrimination to those who draw a sharp
distinction between cash prices and shadow prices.
VII
We conclude with capsule reviews of those issues that, on the
basis of Sections III through VI, seem ripe for future work or badly
in need of it One of them is the means by which contracts are enforced
24. Hahn's concept of "conjectural equilibrium" should be mentioned here because
it, too, relies on constraint expectations. Rationing in Hahn's work |1978|, however,
is not due to price rigidity; it comes about because individuals, say producers, perceive
that they can exceed their ration if they accept a lower unit price. We do not yet know
whether such perceptions are consistent with price observations in equilibrium.
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on firms. One intuitive answer is obvious here; firms do not wish to
jeopardize the investments in hiring, training, and information
gathering that attend long-lived job attachments. But intuition alone
will not suffice for a thorough understanding, of, say, earnings profiles,
unless it is buttressed by systematic formal work on the relation be-
tween specific human capital and long-term contracts.-'' The problem
of employer reputation is also relevant here; we shall return to it
lielow.
The stock market is long overdue for some attention in implicit
contract theorizing, which is built on an excessively strong assumption
of market incompleteness,-** namely that contracts are the only means
of redistributing risk. Formal models often begin with entrepreneurs
of infinite risk-tolerance; much as this simplifies our analyses, we do
recognize that third parties share in the ultimate bearing of risks on
human capital. As Baily stressed in 1974, entrepreneurs are in part
intermediaries between workers and the securities markets, especially
the stock market, where risks are finally diversified.
Asymmetric information is another area that holds considerable
promise as a source of applications to labor economics and macro-
economics. There are a very large number of substantive issues as well
as of possible permutations of informational asymmetries, so we
mention just four. First, information that is private to workers may
be essential in understanding why inefficient underemployment often
takes the form of layoffs rather than worksharing, and what role the
public sector has in the provision of unemployment insurance.^^
Second, bilateral asymmetric information (i.e., information that is
in part private to workers, and in part private to firms) is critical for
determining whether the inefficient volume of employment supported
by contracts in equilibrium is too large, too small, or a combination
that depends on the prevailing state of nature. Third, a potential
mechanism for enforcing contracts on employers is through reputa-
tions. When the employment relation is long-lived and the discount
rate is low enough, reputation by itself may be sufficient to overcome
the problem of moral hazard: self-selection constraints become su-
perfluous because the worker need ascertain that the employer tells
the truth only "on average" (see Radner [1981] and Newbery and
Stiglitz [1982]). And fourth, private information needs to be combined
25. Harris and Holmstrom [1982) have made an interesting start in that direc-
tion.
26. One exception we are aware of is Peters [ 1982].
27. Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz 11982], and (ieanakoplos and Ito [1981] study the
limits this type of asymmetry places on the structure of severance pay and on the
profitability of worksharinR.
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with public information^^ if we are ever to make equilibrium sense
of the Keynesian proposition that unemployment is related to changes
in publicly observable signals like policy variables.
Macroeconomic applications, moreover, require the imbedding
of contracts in some aggregative model of general equilibrium that
contains at least one paper asset.^^ Because implicit contracts are
really portfolios of claims contingent, at most, on states of public in-
formation, the properties of these macroeconomic models will depend
heavily on how much market incompleteness is built into them. The
existence or prevalence of contracts with rigid money wages, the na-
ture and extent of unemployment, the efficacy of various stabilization
policies, all will hinge on what securities individuals may use to di-
versify the risks that confront them. There are no hard and fast rules
to help one choose which markets should be open and which ones
closed. In the tradition of temporary equilibrium theory (see Hart
[1975], and Grandmont's survey article [1977]), we may fix market
structure arbitrarily (say, by imposing large costs on certain trans-
actions), and study the consequences; or we may follow the more de-
manding dictates of the asymmetric information literature and allow
trade in claims contingent on any publicly observable event. We
cannot predict the outcome here, but we suspect that sorting out the
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